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INTRODUCTION
On May 18, 2004, the State of Texas executed Kelsey
Patterson, a man long diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia,
for the murders of Louis Oates and Dorothy Harris.2 Twelve
years earlier, Patterson had gone to the loading dock of Oates
Oil Company and shot Oates with a .38-caliber Pistol.3
Patterson then killed Oates’ secretary when she walked out of
her office and screamed at finding Oates’ body on the ground.4
Patterson made no effort to conceal the crimes. Instead, he
returned home, informed his roommate of what he had done,5
undressed to his socks, and began pacing and shouting in the
street.6
After Patterson was found competent to stand trial,7 his
lawyers raised the insanity defense.8 Patterson never asserted
a motive for the killings.9 Throughout his legal proceedings, he
claimed to be controlled by outside forces through implants and
to be a victim of conspiracy and poisoning.10 Though Patterson
2

David Carson, Texas Execution Information Center, Kelsey Patterson, at
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/322.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
3
th
Patterson v. Cockrell, 69 Fed.Appx. 658, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1 (5 Cir.
May 23, 2003).
4
Carson, supra note 2.
5
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1.
6
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 1.
7
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. At Patterson’s competency hearing
before a jury, defense counsel had relied on the cross-examination of the state’s
witnesses, clinical psychologist Walter Quijano and forensic psychiatrist James
Grigson. AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 6. Neither of these expert
witnesses evaluated Patterson in person. Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **5. Based
on his records alone, Dr. Quijano diagnosed Patterson with schizophrenia and Dr.
Grigson proposed that Patterson had learned to fake psychosis. Id. Both doctors
believed Patterson was competent to stand trial. Id.
8
The contemporary notion of insanity in American criminal law has its roots
in the famed M’Naghten case of 1843. See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, “Literature as
Law”: The History of the Insanity Plea and a Fictional Application Within the Law &
Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 381 (1999). Daniel M’Naghten was found not guilty
by reason of insanity in England after shooting to death Edward Drummond while in
the grip of extreme paranoia and believing Drummond to be the prime minister. Id. at
390-92. This verdict caused Queen Victoria to question the rationale behind the
decision of the House of Lords, prompting a series of questions that resulted in the
M’Naghten Rule:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Id. at 392.
9
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. See also AIUSA, Another Texas
Injustice, at 1.
10
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 1, 6.
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continually interrupted trial proceedings to insist that he was a
victim of conspiracy,11 the judge did not return to the issue of
competency.12 Further, the prosecution elicited testimony that
it was feasible to feign psychotic symptoms.13 Even more
significantly, the prosecution intermittently punctuated the
trial with statements that encouraged the jury to treat
Patterson’s schizophrenia as an indicator of future
dangerousness.14 The jury deliberated about four hours before
recommending the death penalty.15
The low standard for competence, the effects of severe
mental illness on the defendant’s courtroom behavior, and the
tendency for the prosecutor to present a mental disorder as an
aggravating factor instead of a mitigating factor exemplify the
serious disadvantages a severely mentally ill defendant faces in
capital proceedings. Such circumstances have led state
lawmakers to consider adding a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole in Texas.16 Public outcry over Patterson’s
execution,17 and the execution of others with a similar
psychiatric background,18 reflect the burgeoning controversy
over whether individuals with severe mental illness should be
excluded from capital punishment.
In June of 2002, the Supreme Court in Atkins v.
Virginia19 found it unconstitutional to execute people with
mental retardation.20 The Court convincingly demonstrated
that the execution of criminals with mental retardation
11

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
13
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **5.
14
See text accompanying footnote 209, infra.
15
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 13.
16
Scott Gold, The Nation; Texas Weighs Its Life or Death Decisions; The
Execution of A Schizophrenic Man Helps Build Support for A New Sentencing Option in
Capital Cases: Life without Parole. L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at A17. See also Mary
th
Alice Robbins, A Preview of the Action the 79 Texas Legislature Will See, 20 TEXAS
LAWYER 14, Jan. 10, 2005.
17
See Gold, supra note 16. See also Editorial, Our View: Two More Death
Penalty Inequities, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, May 21, 2004, at 8A; Cato Meador,
Editorial, Letter Regarding Kelsey Patterson, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 30, 2004, at
2H. Dr. Maria Felix-Ortiz, In Texas, Mental-Health Spending Is Down, Executions
Continue, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 9, 2004, at 9G.
18
See generally Editorial, Executing the Mentally Ill; The Execution of a
Person Who Has Suffers [sic] from Mental Illness is Cruel and Unusual and Should Be
Outlawed, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Apr. 6, 2003, at 02H; Editorial, Genuine Justice
Calls for Sparing Severely Mentally Ill, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 6, 2002, at 42.
19
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
20
Id. Because mental retardation and other mental disorders classify
disorders and not the people themselves, this author attempts to avoid expressions
such as “mentally retarded” or “schizophrenic.”
12
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amounts to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment, given their diminished culpability due to
factors ranging from subaverage intellect to impaired social
functioning.21 The Atkins rationale compels the conclusion that
the death penalty should likewise be found unconstitutional as
imposed on defendants with a severe mental disorder who
suffer from similar disabling effects.
This Note proposes a categorical exemption from capital
punishment for individuals with severe mental disorders. To
provide necessary context for the analysis, this Note first
discusses the Eighth Amendment’s mandate that capital
punishment be commensurate with the character of the
defendant and his or her criminal offense, and the Supreme
Court’s corresponding emphasis on proportionality review and
moral culpability. Part Two looks closely at the Supreme
Court’s discussion of reduced moral culpability in capital
defendants with mental retardation in Atkins. Part Three
reviews state death penalty statute provisions that have a
bearing on mental illness and the viewpoints of various justices
and communities towards the execution of the mentally ill to
demonstrate that people with severe mental illness should also
be considered less morally culpable. Part Four examines the
nature of severe mental disorders and compares how mental
retardation and severe mental illness impact the individual. In
Part Five, the cases of Kelsey Patterson, James Colburn, and
Charles Walker illustrate how the experiences of defendants
with severe mental disorders in capital proceedings implicate
the exact concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Atkins.
Finally, Part Six cautions against limiting the scope of severe
mental illness as a mitigator and addresses the implications of
applying Atkins to offenders with severe mental disorders. Part
Seven concludes this Note with comments on the evolving
standards of decency in the United States.
I.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, PERSONAL CULPABILITY, AND
THE PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY

The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits the use of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”22 In capital cases, the Supreme Court has
21
22

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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generally construed this prohibition to mean that a sentence of
death must not be excessive and must serve some penological
justification, such as retribution or deterrence, so as not to
result in the “gratuitous infliction of suffering.”23 The Court has
further held that certain crimes that do not involve the taking
of human life are per se ineligible for the death penalty because
such a sentence would be excessive.24 Certain individuals might
also be ineligible regardless of the crime committed.25 This bar
might occur when, taking into account the individual’s
character and background, the death penalty would offend
“currently prevailing standards of decency.”26
The idea that “punishment should be directly related to
the personal culpability of the criminal defendant”27 has been
central to the Court’s analysis of whether the death sentence is
excessive.28 Indeed, the reality that not every defendant in a
capital case is sentenced to death reflects the attitude that
“only the most deserving” should be executed.29 Proportionality
review implies that some capital defendants may not be
culpable enough to warrant the death penalty.30 The fact that
the individual’s level of culpability lies on a continuum is
reflected by state statutes that provide for the assessment of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in capital trials. It is
only at the extreme end of this continuum that the public will
deem the criminal deserving of execution.31 In this way, the
death penalty becomes “an expression of society’s moral
outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”32
Deterrence also plays a role in considerations of capital
sentencing. The Court has found that “the death penalty has
little deterrent force against defendants who have reduced
23

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976).
See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death
penalty was a disproportionate punishment for rape).
25
Alyssa C. Lareau & Grant H. Willis, Thirty-First Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure IV. Sentencing, Capital Punishment, 90 GEO. L.J. 1838, 1842
(2002).
26
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
27
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987)).
28
Van W. Ellis, Note, Guilty but Mentally Ill and the Death Penalty:
Punishment Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE L.J. 87, 90 (1994).
29
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
30
Ellis, supra note 28, at 90.
31
Joseph A. Nese, The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination
of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373,
401 (2002).
32
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
24
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capacity for considered choice.”33 When the death penalty does
not serve either the goal of retribution or that of deterrence, it
purposelessly imposes pain and suffering.34
Accordingly, the Court has held that the provisions of
the Eighth Amendment require an analysis of the defendant’s
personal culpability in capital sentencing and an assessment of
whether the aims of retribution or deterrence are met. These
requirements come to bear significantly on the Supreme Court
holding in Atkins.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT FINDINGS
RETARDATION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

ON

MENTAL

In Atkins, the Supreme Court barred the execution of
individuals with mental retardation finding that although the
deficiencies of mental retardation did not exempt a defendant
from criminal responsibility, they did diminish his or her moral
culpability.35 The Court premised its holding on the Eighth
Amendment’s bar against excessive punishment and the
accompanying need for proportionality review.36 As the Court
had pointed out in Penry v. Lynaugh,37 such proportionality
review is best informed by the actions of state legislatures.38
Hence, the Court reviewed state death penalty statutes,
examined the evidence of a national consensus against capital
punishment for persons with mental retardation, and noted the
impact of mental retardation on these defendants.
The Atkins Court evaluated whether society regards
people with mental retardation less culpable than the average
criminal by observing the changes in state death penalty laws
that had been enacted since 1986.39 That year marked the
execution of Jerome Bowden, a Georgia death row inmate said
to have an IQ of 65.40 Bowden’s execution led to the first state
statute bar against execution of offenders with mental
retardation.41 In the next few years, Georgia and Maryland
enacted death penalty legislation prohibiting capital
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
Id. at 311.
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 313 n.8.
Id. at 313-14.
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punishment for people with mental retardation.42 The decision
in Penry followed in 1989, in which the Court found that the
defendant’s mental retardation alone did not exempt him from
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.43 The Court
later reversed Penry’s death sentence, however, on the ground
that the statute deprived the sentencer of an adequate means
of giving mitigating effect to Penry’s mental retardation.44 In
response to Bowden’s execution and Penry, many state
legislatures enacted death penalty statutes similar to the laws
of Georgia and Maryland. The Atkins Court noted that the
State trend45 of barring execution of persons with mental
retardation indicated that society has come to regard such
people as less culpable.46
In further support of its finding of a national consensus,
the Court noted that professional organizations such as the
American Psychological Association and the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), recognized for
their expertise in mental health, had officially taken a stance
against imposing the death penalty on criminal offenders with
mental retardation.47 Additionally, the Court reported that
various religious groups had together filed an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of a petitioner with mental retardation, because
despite their differences, these amici “share a conviction that
the execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be
morally justified.”48 The Court then acknowledged the
widespread disapproval within the world community of
executing offenders with mental retardation.49 The Court found
this consensus to reflect a “widespread judgment about the
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the
relationship between mental retardation and the penological
purposes served by the death penalty.”50
Moreover, the Court noted that “some characteristics of
mental retardation undermine the strength of the procedural

42

Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 340.
44
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001).
45
As the Court specifically stated: “It is not so much the number of these
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.” Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
46
Id. at 314-16.
47
Id. at 316 n.21 (citation omitted).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
43

2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM

1002

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards.”51
According to the AAMR, a person considered to have mental
retardation exhibits an intelligence quotient (IQ) of somewhere
around 70 to 75 at the highest, as well as deficits manifested by
problems with self-care, social interaction, employment,
education, and health.52 A person is diagnosed with mental
retardation if subaverage intelligence and limitations in
adaptive functioning are present before the individual turns
eighteen years old.53 Discussing the impact of mental
retardation on the offender’s thought processes, the Court
acknowledged that people with mental retardation are
paradoxically often found competent to stand trial, despite
reduced capacities to analyze information, think logically,
articulate, learn from mistakes, and comprehend human
behavior.54 The Court noted that even given these deficiencies,
“[t]here is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a
premeditated plan.”55
The Court found these cognitive and behavioral defects
to reduce the moral culpability of defendants with mental
retardation.56 Consequently, where the death penalty is
typically not appropriate retribution for crimes committed by a
person of average intelligence, it offends contemporary
standards of decency in the case of defendants with mental
retardation.57 Furthermore, deterrence is not measurably
served by executing individuals who are unable to see that
certain acts might result in the death penalty, and so cannot
adjust their conduct accordingly.58
51

Id. at 318.
Id. at 308 n.3. See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION
(AAMR), Definition of Mental Retardation, available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/
faq_mental_retardation.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
53
AAMR, supra note 52. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) criteria parallel
that of AAMR. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV 39-46 (1994). Adaptive functioning
or behavior refers to “the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that people
have learned so they can function in their everyday lives. Significant limitations in
adaptive behavior impact a person’s daily life and affect the ability to respond to a
particular situation or to the environment.” AAMR, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked
Questions about Mental Retardation, available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/
faq_mental_retardation.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
54
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 320.
57
Id. at 319.
58
Id. at 320.
52
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In addition to recognizing that retribution and
deterrence are not furthered by imposing the death penalty on
people with mental retardation, the Court determined that
such individuals suffer significant disadvantages during legal
proceedings.59 Because of the reduced capacity that mental
retardation causes, defendants are more vulnerable to
situations generating false confessions and they are sometimes
unable to assist counsel or provide adequate testimony.60
Equally as crucial, jurors might misperceive the attitudes of
the defendants towards their crimes based on their outward
appearance, which “may create an unwarranted impression of
lack of remorse for their crimes.”61 Perhaps even more
important, evidence of mental retardation as a mitigating
factor can act as a “two-edged sword” that jurors also regard as
an indicator of future dangerousness.62 Given all these
encumbrances, the Court concluded that defendants with
mental retardation “face a special risk of wrongful execution.”63
The weight the Court gives to functional and cognitive
impairment in assessing both culpability and vulnerability in
legal proceedings casts serious doubt on the constitutionality of
imposing the death penalty on individuals with severe mental
illness. Thus, where defendants experience impaired cognitive
and adaptive functioning that reduce culpability and lead to
vulnerabilities during legal proceedings, and where evidence
exists that society denounces capital punishment for such
persons, the Supreme Court should exempt severely mentally
ill offenders from the death penalty.

59
60
61
62
63

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 321.
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III.

APPLYING THE RATIONALE OF ATKINS TO OFFENDERS
WITH SEVERE MENTAL DISORDERS

A.

State Death Penalty Statutes64 and Severe Mental Illness
as a Mitigating Factor

The overwhelming majority of state statutes contain
mitigating factors that implicate mental illness.65 Many capital
statutes, like the Model Penal Code, permit the defendant to
proffer evidence that the offense was committed “under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” as a
mitigating circumstance relevant to determination of a
sentence less than death.66 Some states do not even require that
such mental or emotional disturbance be “extreme,” but only
that the condition had an “influence” on the defendant’s
conduct at the time of the offense.67
64

Currently, over one-fifth of state jurisdictions do not have death penalty
statutes. Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. Deborah Fins, Death Row
U.S.A. Summer 2004, A Quarterly Report by the Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., at 1, 3, available at http://www.naac
pldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA_Summer_2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
This absence automatically excludes individuals with severe mental illness from
capital punishment in twelve states, as well as the District of Columbia. Id.
65
See Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97,
n.108 (2002). See also Ellen F. Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating
Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1989). See also
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
Death without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty
in the United States, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 487, 529 (2002) (noting that those death penalty
statutes following the Model Penal Code implicate mental illness).
66
See Ellen Fels Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-98 (1989) (emphasis added). See also
MPC 210.6(4)(b). See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(1) (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.3(d) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/91(c)(2) (2004); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(2) (2003);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2004)(2)(b)(2); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(b)
(2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3)(2)
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(b) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(2)(c)
(2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(2) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(f)
(2004) (refers to an offense committed under “severe mental or emotional disturbance”);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(5)(a) (2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(2) (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(2) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(i)-(ii) (2004); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(ii)-(iii) (2004).
67
See NM Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (2005); NY
CPL § 400.27 (9)(e). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) (1976); Utah Criminal
Code § 76-3-207. In June of 2004, the State of New York Court of Appeals struck down
the state’s death penalty statute as unconstitutional due to a problematic jury
instruction requirement in the penalty phase. 783 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. 2004). At the
time of publication, New York State Assembly members remain undecided as to
whether or not to correct this flaw and reinstate the death penalty. Patrick D. Healy,
Death Penalty Seems Unlikely to Be Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at B1.
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In addition to mental or emotional disturbance, twentyeight states—well over half of those jurisdictions that have
death penalty statutes—give mental illness mitigating impact
by allowing the jury to consider the defendant’s capacity.68
These states commonly refer to “the capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality [or wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” as being
“impaired” or “significantly” or “substantially impaired.”69 Many
of these provisions expressly stipulate that this impairment be
due to “mental disease or defect” or “mental illness.”70
Connecticut has gone so far as to bar the death penalty when
such incapacity is found.71
Death penalty statutes may also implicate severe
mental illness as a mitigating factor with other language.
Oregon, for instance, instructs jurors to consider “the extent of
mental or emotional pressure under which the defendant was
acting at the time the offense was committed.”72 Illinois, on the
other hand, looks more broadly at whether the defendant
68

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (Michie
2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(b)
(2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West
2004); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626 (2004); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); LA.CODE CRIM. PROC ANN. art. 905.5
(West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL CAUSES § 4-343 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9919-101 (2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304
(2005); NEB. REV. ST. § 29-2523 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2005); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6 (Michie 2004); N.Y. CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (2005);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (West 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2005); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 2005); TEX. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2005); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.070 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2005).
69
See statutes cited supra note 66.
70
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (3) (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h)
(1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (2004); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.5(e) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3(i)(5)(d) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.04(B)(3) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(8) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
10.95.070. Kentucky and Nebraska specifically refer to the term “mental illness.” KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2)(b)7 (2002); NEB. REV. ST. § 29-2523(2)g) (2004).
Maryland refers to “mental incapacity” and “mental disorder.” MD. R. CR. PROC. § 4343 (4).
71
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h) (2001). The statute states:
The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury
or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict . . . that at the time
of the offense . . . the defendant’s mental capacity was significantly impaired
or the defendant’s ability to conform the defendant’s conduct to the
requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either
case as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
Id. This mitigating circumstance is listed separately from that of mental retardation.
Id.
72
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(c)(A) (2005) (emphasis added).
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“suffers from a reduced mental capacity.”73 Finally, South
Carolina asks jurors to consider the “mentality of the defendant
at the time of the crime.”74
The consistent inclusion of a mental illness component
in death penalty statutes indicates that some degree of mental
illness falling short of insanity must be weighed during
sentencing. While the provisions do not explain exactly what is
meant by “mental disturbance” or impairment of capacity, such
criteria would surely embrace a person suffering from a severe
mental disorder.75 This pattern among death penalty statutes of
considering
the
defendant’s
mental
condition
and
corresponding inability to act within the law suggests that a
majority of legislatures recognize the potential of mental illness
to mitigate a person’s culpability.76
B.

Views of State Justices, Experts and Religious and
World Communities

The codification of mental illness in numerous state
death penalty statutes reflects agreement amongst
professional, religious and world communities that defendants
with severe mental disorders should be excluded from capital
punishment. While this codification may not be as clearly laid
out as statutes prohibiting execution of criminal offenders with
mental retardation, it does appear to indicate “a much broader
social and professional consensus.”77 Many justices presiding
over capital cases have cast doubt over the appropriateness of
73

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c)(7) (2004) (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (2004) (emphasis added). This factor is
noted separately from the circumstance of mental retardation. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10).
75
See infra Part IV.
76
Judges have certainly understood these statutes to give effect in this
manner. For example, in vacating an order dismissing a capital defendant’s petition for
post-conviction relief, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court judge deemed that evidence of a
defendant’s chronic schizophrenia “would have been sufficient to implicate the mentalhealth mitigators, namely that Appellant was under the influence of an extreme
mental or emotional disturbance, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or conform it to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.”
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 2004 WL 3050831, at *37 (Pa. 2004). In another instance, a
Seventh Circuit judge referred to the Indiana death penalty statute as having two
mitigating factors “to which mental illness can be relevant” and cited the following
provisions: “‘was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when
the murders were committed’” and “‘the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of
intoxication.’” Baird v. David, 388 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing IND. CODE §
35-502-9(C)(2) (2004)).
77
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
74
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excluding people with severe mental disorders from the death
penalty. In State v. Scott,78 Justice Pfeifer dissented from the
majority’s opinion which had affirmed a death sentence for a
man with schizophrenia.79 Arguing that evolving standards of
decency prohibited the man’s execution, Pfeifer wrote:
I cannot get past one simple irrefutable fact: he has chronic,
undifferentiated schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. Mental
illness is a medical disease. Every year we learn more about it and
the way it manifests itself in the mind of the sufferer. At this time,
we do not and cannot know what is going on in the mind of a person
with mental illness. As a society, we have always treated those with
mental illness differently from those without. In the interest of
human dignity, we must continue to do so.80

Another justice, dissenting in Corcoran v. State,81 cited
Atkins to propose that the death penalty should not be imposed
on an individual with severe mental illness. Acknowledging
that the defendant in this case who received a death sentence
did not have mental retardation, Justice Rucker asserted that
“the underlying rationale for prohibiting executions of the
mentally retarded is just as compelling for prohibiting
executions of the seriously mentally ill, namely evolving
standards of decency.”82 Still another justice, in State v.
Nelson,83 relied heavily on Atkins in his concurrence.84
Contending that the defendant’s “irrationalities” lessened her
culpability, Justice Zazzali opined that “if the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to invoke the death penalty as
our most extreme sanction, then the lesser culpability of
Nelson, given her history of mental illness and its connection to
her crimes, ‘surely does not merit that form of retribution.’”85
Additionally, a number of justices have questioned the
imposition of the death penalty on individuals with mental
illness in other contexts. For example, in December of 2004,
two former North Carolina Supreme Court justices urged
Governor Mike Easley to commute the sentence of Charles
Walker, a death row inmate who suffers from a severe mental
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

dissenting).

748 N.E.2d 11 (Ohio 2001).
Id.
Id. at 20.
774 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 2002).
Id. at 502.
803 A.2d 1, 47 (N.J. 2002).
Id.
Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)) (Zazzali, J.,
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disorder.86 “‘To spare Walker’s life and impose a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole is particularly appropriate,’”
wrote Exum in a letter to the Governor, “‘because of the role
Walker’s long-standing mental illness—paranoid schizophrenia
—played in the proceeding leading to his sentence of death.’”87
In 2002, a group of twenty-one retired state and federal judges
in Illinois wrote an open letter to then Governor George Ryan,
urging him to commute the death sentences to life without
parole in cases where the fairness and accuracy of the
conviction or sentence was in doubt.88 They referred to mental
illness as one of the legitimate bases for granting clemency.89 In
that same year, United States District Judge William Wayne
Justice openly criticized the Texas criminal justice system for
approaching the mentally ill with “a spirit of vengeance.”90 He
referred to Andrea Yates, a woman diagnosed with
schizophrenia who had drowned her children, to illustrate one
who could not be “justly blame[d].”91 The federal judge alluded
to the notion of moral culpability, stating, “‘If we reject the
moral necessity to distinguish between those who willingly do
evil, and those who do dreadful acts on account of unbalanced
minds, we will do injury to these people.’”92 Other judges,
despite their affirmation of death sentences, have made critical
remarks about the outcome of death penalty cases involving
the severely mentally ill, perhaps hinting at an inconsistency
between what is considered legally appropriate and what
punishment they feel a capital defendant morally deserves.93
Organizations with germane expertise in the realm of
mental health and religious and world communities agree with
this sentiment to evaluate criminal offenders with severe
86

Andrea Weigl, Former Justices Urge Mercy, NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 24,
2004, at B5. See also infra Part V.C.
87
Weigl, supra note 86.
88
John F. Cirricone et al., An Open Letter from Retired Judges to Governor
George Ryan (Dec. 1, 2002), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/
wrongful/documents/JudgeLet1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
89
Id.
90
James Kimberly, Justice Defends Mentally Ill/U.S. Judge Chides Texas
Law’s “Spirit of Vengeance”, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 26, 2002, at 29.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Fifth Circuit Justice Edith H. Jones apparently expressed frustration
about Kelsey Patterson’s case and asked, “What are we doing here?” She then
reportedly said to Assistant Attorney General Gina Bunn, “This is a very sick man.”
Mike Tolson, Mentally Ill Killer’s Life on the Line, HOUST. CHRON., Aug. 11, 2002, at
A37. Justice Fortunato Benavides spoke out more strongly, evidently blaming Texas’s
mental health system for continually discharging Patterson back into the community
where he eventually committed the two murders. Id.
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mental disorders in capital sentencing proceedings more like
offenders with mental retardation. For instance, organizations
such as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the
American Psychological Association (APA) and the National
Mental Health Association (NMHA) have taken an official
stance against capital punishment as imposed on persons with
severe mental illness.94 In the same vein, four of the twelve
religious group amici supporting the petitioner in Atkins
believe that the death penalty is never a legitimate
punishment when it is aimed at persons who are more
“vulnerable” than the average person or who suffer from a
mental illness or disability.95 Two of the other groups similarly
emphasized that it is the decreased culpability of people with
mental retardation that renders the death penalty particularly
inappropriate for this population.96 These religious amici’s
concerns about vulnerability and decreased culpability readily
apply to individuals with severe mental disorders.97
In addition to American professional and religious
communities, world communities have expressed strong
opposition to the execution of people with severe mental
94

See National Mental Health Association, News Release, NMHA Announces
Position on Death Penalty (Apr. 3, 2001), available at http://www.nmha.org/
newsroom/system/news.vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=276 (last visited Dec. 23, 2004); National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Press Release, No Death Penalty for Persons with Severe
Mental Illnesses (Jan. 12, 1998), available at http://www.nami.org/Content/
ContentGroups/Press_Room1/1998/January_1998/No_Death_Penalty_For_Persons_
With_Severe_Mental_Illnesses_hr__i_Statement_By_Laurie_M__Flynn,_Execut.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2005); American Psychiatric Association Online, Resolution on the
Death Penalty in the United States (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/
deathpenalty.html?CFID=2646048&CFTOKEN=67528764 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
95
Brief of Amici Curiae, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2000),
available at http://www.usccb.org/ogc/amicuscuriae3.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
The General Board of Church and Society and the General Board of Global Ministries
of the United Methodist Church specifically call on society to “protect the civil rights of
persons with disabilities” and refer to the “the well-established principle that
diminished mental capacity also reduces moral culpability.” The General Synod of The
United Church of Christ reports “an immediate focus on ending the execution of
juvenile offenders and persons with mental retardation or mental illness.” Clifton
Kirkpatrick, as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church,
U.S.A., indicates that “those who are ‘most vulnerable, most likely to be forgotten,
exploited or oppressed, most unable to defend’” are entitled to “special protection.” The
Mennonite Central Committee, U.S. Washington Office emphasizes “God’s special
concern for those who are weak, neglected and vulnerable.” Id. (emphasis added).
96
Id. (emphasis added). The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
“believes the execution of persons with mental retardation is particularly inappropriate
because of their diminished culpability,” while the Foundation for the Preservation of
the Mahayana Tradition, Inc. believes that because people with mental retardation are
“less culpable than would otherwise be the case . . . it behooves us to treat these
individuals with care and compassion.” Id.
97
See discussion infra Part IV. C.
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disorders. The European Union (EU), whose brief the Court
cited in Atkins when noting that the world community
“overwhelmingly disapprove[s]” of capital punishment for
individuals with mental retardation,98 has specifically spoken
out against inflicting the death penalty on any person with a
serious mental illness.99 In a letter written to urge the
commutation of Kelsey Patterson’s death sentence,
representatives of the EU Presidency stated, “The EU strongly
believes that the execution of persons suffering from a mental
disorder is contrary to widely accepted human rights norms
and in contradiction to the minimum standards of human
rights set forth in several international human rights
instruments.”100 This view reflects that of the Office of the
United Nations Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR).101
The provisions of the OHCHR Resolution 2002/77 urge that all
non-abolitionist States refrain from imposing the death penalty
“on a person suffering from any form of mental disorder or to
execute any such person.”102 Certainly “any form of mental
disorder” includes severe mental illness.103
While international communities tend to oppose capital
punishment in general and for individuals with mental
disorders in particular,104 national polls suggest that the United
States public also opposes the death penalty for individuals
98

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
European Union, Delegation of the European Commission to the United
States, EU Policy on the Death Penalty, Letter to Governor of Georgia (Feb. 2002),
available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/WilliamsGAGovLett.htm
(last visited Dec. 23, 2004). The EU is a treaty-based international organization
comprised of fifteen countries working towards forging strong ties between European
peoples. Id.
100
Letter from European Union to Governor of Texas (April 26, 2004),
available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/DEMAR1APatterson.pdf
(last visited on Jan. 3, 2005).
101
The OHCHR is composed of 53 member states spanning several continents
that strive to defend human rights and promote implementation of agreed upon
international standards. See UNITED NATIONS CYBER SCHOOL BUS, Human Rights and
the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/
about/history.asp (last visited March 26, 2005). See also OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Brochure, Preface, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/enu6//OHCHR.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
102
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, The Question
of the Death Penalty, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/77, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/e93443efabf7a6c4c1256bab0
0500ef6?Opendocument (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
103
See discussion supra Part III.B.
104
Id. See also EUROPEAN UNION IN THE US, EU Memorandum on the Death
Penalty, available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/eumemorandum.
htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
99
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with severe mental disorders. Varying reports on a Gallup Poll
conducted in May of 2002 found that when asked whether they
favored or opposed the death penalty for “the mentally ill,”
between seventy-three and seventy-five percent of Americans
responded that they opposed it.105 This number approaches the
eighty-two percent of respondents who said they opposed the
death penalty for “the mentally retarded.”106 Additionally, in the
appendix to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Atkins, poll
results showed that 63.8% of Americans nationwide do not
support execution of the “mentally impaired.”107 Although the
Court interpreted the term “mentally impaired” to refer to the
mentally retarded, there is nothing to indicate that the poll
respondents excluded the severely mentally ill from
consideration. While the terms “mentally ill” and “mentally
impaired” may seem undefined, individuals with severe mental
disorders undeniably fit within either description. Thus, the
polling data strongly suggests that a significant segment of the
United States disapproves of executing the mentally ill, a
population that would encompass at the very least those
persons with severe mental disorders. These national polls,
combined with state statutes, court opinions, and the views of
world communities, reveal an overwhelming consensus
opposing imposition of capital punishment on defendants with
severe mental disorders.

IV.

SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
DEFENDANT: A COMPARISON WITH THE DECREASED
CULPABILITY AND VULNERABILITIES OF DEFENDANTS
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

A.

Criteria for Mental Illness in General

Severe mental disorders comprise a narrow category
under the catch-all mental illness grouping and can arguably
be characterized as involving impaired mental functioning.108
105

See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Summaries of Recent Poll
Findings, National Polls, available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=
23&did=210#Gallup3/30/00 (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). See also Death Penalty, The
Gallup Poll, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2004).
106
See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 105; Gallup Poll, supra
note 105.
107
Atkins, 536 U.S. at Appendix to Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J. (2002).
108
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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Mental illness itself is generally thought of as encompassing
distinct categories of mental disorders marked by impairment
in cognition, mood, and behavior stemming from abnormal
brain function.109 People diagnosed with these disorders
experience symptoms that vary in degree of severity, duration,
and disturbance of daily performance.110 As with other medical
illnesses, these symptoms lie on a continuum.111 At one end, the
less severe disorders respond to outpatient psychotherapy and
medication monitoring.112 At the other end, severe mental
disorders involve gross functional impairment and psychosis
which often incapacitate the individual to the point that
hospitalization is required.113
B.

Severe Mental Illness, Prognosis and Lack of Insight

Severe mental illness is usually restricted to categories
of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder
(i.e. manic depression).114 The symptoms associated with these
disorders, such as hallucinations and delusions, are principally
treated with antipsychotic medication115 and increase the need

109

OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 2, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL
ILLNESS, OVERVIEW OF MENTAL ILLNESS 39 (1999), available at http://www.surgeon
general.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS].
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 65-70.
113
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DEFINITION OF SEVERE MENTAL
ILLNESS, at http://www.psych.org/aids/modules/illness/sld005.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2004). See also TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, FAQ:
SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/PressRoom/
presskits/AboutTACPressKit/abouttacdoc2.htm#AA_SMI (last visited March 20, 2005)
[hereinafter FAQ].
114
FAQ, supra note 113. For a description of schizophrenia see discussion
infra Part IV. C.1. Bipolar disorder is an illness causing fluctuations in mood and is
characterized by depressive and/or manic episodes. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 350-51.
A manic episode may entail grandiose ideas, decreased sleep, rapid speech, tangential
thinking, and excessive, impulsive behavior, and is often accompanied by psychotic
symptoms. Id. A depressive episode is marked by depressed mood throughout the day,
apathy, sleep and appetite disturbances, restlessness or loss of energy, distractibility,
feelings of worthlessness, and suicidal thoughts. Id. at 327. Individuals diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder exhibit symptoms of both schizophrenia and a mood disorder.
Id. at 292. See generally A. Benabarre et al., Bipolar Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder
and Schizophrenia: Epidemiologic, Clinical and Prognostic Differences, 16 EUR.
PSYCHIATRY, 167 (2001).
115
See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH (NIMH), Schizophrenia,
at 13-15, available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.pdf (last visited Jan.
28, 2005) [hereinafter NIMH].
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for hospitalization during acute episodes.116 Like mental
retardation, these conditions are not “curable,” although they
may be treatable with medication.117 Because there are several
types of severe mental disorders with variations in symptoms,
there is no definite course of illness.118 For instance, while
advocates and practitioners remain optimistic, statistics reveal
that about half the people diagnosed with schizophrenia will
experience only modest improvement, no improvement, or
death.119 Even taking their medications, about a third will
relapse within a one year time period.120
A person with severe mental illness may be
unsuccessful in seeking treatment or following through with
medication management due to lack of awareness or “insight”
caused by irregularities in brain function.121 This deficiency is
commonly found in both patients with schizophrenia and
patients with bipolar disorder.122 When a person lacks insight,
he or she does not have the ability to realize that he or she is
sick.123 Therefore, when psychotic symptoms cause afflicted
116

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Public Information, Schizophrenia,
available at http://www.psych. rg/public_info/chizo.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Schizophrenia]. The APA reports that “Schizophrenia fills more hospital
beds than almost any other illness, and Federal figures reflect the cost of schizophrenia
to be from $30 billion to $48 billion in direct medical costs, lost productivity and Social
Security pensions.” Id. at 4.
117
FAQ, supra note 113. See also NIMH, supra note 115, at 13.
118
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 4, ADULTS AND MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, COURSE AND
RECOVERY, at 274 (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
entalhealth/chapter4/sec4_1.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2004) (“Most individuals
experience periods of symptom exacerbation and remission, while others maintain a
steady level of symptoms and disability which can range from moderate to severe.”). Id.
119
FAQ, supra note 113. See also SURGEON GENERAL, SCHIZOPHRENIA,
COURSE AND RECOVERY, supra note 118, at 274 (“Most do not return to their prior state
of mental function.”). The course of illness is influenced by factors such as the
individual’s biological vulnerabilities, personal motivation, family or other social
support, and socioeconomic status. Id.
120
FAQ, supra note 113.
121
See Stefano Pallanti, et al., Awareness of Illness and Subjective Experience
of Cognitive Complaints in Patients with Bipolar I and Bipolar II Disorder, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1094 (July 1999). “Poor awareness of one’s own mental illness is an
established feature in schizophrenia.” Celso Arango, et al., Relationship of Awareness
of Dyskinesia in Schizophrenia to Insight into Mental Illness, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1097 (July 1999). The medical term for lack of insight is “anosognosia,” which literally
means “to not know a disease.” TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, Briefing Paper,
Impaired Awareness of Illness (Anosognosia): A Major Problem for Individuals with
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/
BriefingPapers/BP14.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
122
See Pallanti, supra note 121, at 1094. See also Arango, supra note 121, at
1097.
123
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MEDICAL RESOURCES, INSIGHT, available
at http://www.psychlaws.org/MedicalResources/index.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).

2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM

1014

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

persons to erroneously think “that a neighbor is controlling
their behavior with magnetic waves; that people on television
are directing special messages to them; or that their thoughts
are being broadcast aloud to others,” those persons believe such
thoughts to be based in reality.124
Lack of insight differs from denial of one’s illness in that
the former is caused by actual damage to the right hemisphere
of the brain.125 Research indicates that “approximately half of
all patients with schizophrenia and mania have markedly
impaired awareness of their illness as measured by tests of
insight.”126 In some ways, lack of insight renders people with
schizophrenia comparable to patients who have experienced a
stroke or who suffer from Alzheimer's disease.127 Such
individuals consistently refuse to take medication because they
do not believe they are sick. In most cases they will take
medication only under some form of assisted treatment.128
Apart from lack of insight, patients stop complying with
treatment because of uncomfortable side effects, barriers to
treatment, misguided advice to discontinue medications when
the person seems to have improved, and disordered thinking
which causes the person to forget to take medications,.129 The
inability or refusal to comply with treatment tends to lead to
exacerbation of symptoms and coinciding disturbances in
behavior.130 These disturbances can be manifested by
psychiatric hospitalization, suicide attempts, homelessness,
incarceration, and violent acts.131
Although non-adherence to treatment increases the risk
of relapse into acute illness, lay persons frequently do not
understand that individuals with severe mental disorders may
experience a recurrence of psychosis even when compliant with
medications.132 This reality is especially important to consider
when gauging a defendant’s culpability, where jurors might

124

NIMH, supra note 115, at 5-6.
See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 123.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See Diana O. Perkins, Predictors of Noncompliance in Patients with
Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1121, 1123 (Dec. 2002). See also NIMH,
supra note 115, at 16.
130
NIMH, supra note 115, at 7, 9; FAQ, supra note 113.
131
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 123.
132
NIMH, supra note 115, at 15.
125
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erroneously believe that a person has both insight into and
control over his or her illness.133
Severe mental disorders have a clear detrimental
impact on cognition and function, with relatively poor
prognosis for the individual. Therefore, courts should recognize
that such illness affects the criminal offender’s moral
culpability and susceptibility to disadvantage in legal
proceedings, just as the Supreme Court acknowledged the
impact of subaverage intelligence on death row inmates with
mental retardation.
C.

A Comparison of the Impact of the Severe Mental
Disorder of Schizophrenia with the Impact of Mental
Retardation on the Defendant

In order to compare the impact of mental retardation on
capital defendants with the impact of severe mental illness on
the offender, it may be helpful to address their commonalities
by way of example. These next four sections will thus discuss
the range of impairment that individuals with schizophrenia
experience and the effects that psychological and functional
deficiencies have on their moral culpability and vulnerability in
legal proceedings.
1.

Schizophrenia as a severe mental disorder by
which to compare mental retardation

A person with schizophrenia tends to continually
experience either positive or negative symptoms and at
baseline might only be able to minimally care for his or her
needs.134 Positive symptoms involve an exaggeration or
distortion of normal consciousness,135 while negative symptoms
involve blunted personality and emotions, impoverished
thinking, and inability to act in a goal-directed manner.136
133

See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT.
PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 667, 670 (2000) (citing a study involving mock jurors who reasoned
that “‘mental illness is no excuse . . . he should have sought help for his problems.’”).
134
“Complete remission (i.e., a return to full premorbid functioning) is
probably not common in this disorder. Of those who remain ill, some appear to have a
relatively stable course, whereas others show a progressive worsening associated with
severe disability.” DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 282.
135
Id. at 53, at 274-75; FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 109.
136
JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Academic Proceedings Monograph, II.
Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia, 16 J. CLIN. PSYCH. MONOGRAPH 9 (Feb. 1998).
People with negative symptoms appear to have “a diminution of thoughts that is
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People with psychotic disorders like schizophrenia frequently
have disturbed thought processes.137 Because of these
limitations in functioning and thinking, people with
schizophrenia logically provide a group with which to compare
individuals with mental retardation.
While there are different types of schizophrenia, each
form must have at least two of the following symptoms:
delusions; hallucinations; disorganized speech; disorganized or
catatonic behavior; or negative symptoms.138 A person must also
experience a demonstrably lower level of social and
occupational functioning.139 None of these features can be
caused by substance abuse or another medical condition.140
While a diagnosis of schizophrenia requires manifest psychotic
symptoms for at lease one month, signs of the disturbance
overall must last at least six months.141
Schizophrenia as a rule and mental retardation in
general involve known biological components. Scientific
research supports the theory that certain individuals have a
genetic predisposition to schizophrenia, that certain parts of
the brain in these people are structurally abnormal, that
excessive levels of certain chemicals are present in particular
brain pathways, and that these conditions combine with
environmental stressors to produce this disorder.142 According to
the Centers for Disease Control and prevention, mental
retardation can be caused by defects in chromosomes, brain
reflected in decreased fluency and productivity of speech. This must be differentiated
from an unwillingness to speak . . . .” DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 277.
137
SURGEON GENERAL, Schizophrenia, supra note 118.
138
DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 285. If one of these symptoms is particularly
pronounced, for example, the individual has auditory hallucinations in which he or she
hears two or more voices carrying on a conversation, then only one symptom is
required. Id. at 285.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 286.
141
DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 285.
142
See Jae-Jin Kim et al., Regional Neural Dysfunctions in Chronic
Schizophrenia Studied with Positron Emission Tomography, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
542 (Apr. 2000); James J. Levitt, et al., Quantitative Volumetric MRI Study of the
Cerebellum and Vermis in Schizophrenia: Clinical and Cognitive Correlates, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1105 (July 1999); Brendan McDonald et al., Anomalous Asymmetry of
Fusiform and Parahippocampal Gyrus Gray Matter in Schizophrenia: A Postmortem
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 40 (Jan. 2000); Kai Vogeley et al., Disturbed Gyrification
of the Prefrontal Region in Male Schizophrenic Patients: A Morphometric Postmortem
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 34 (July 2000). See also OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 4, ADULTS AND
MENTAL HEALTH, ETIOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA, at 276 (1999), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/chapter4/sec4_1.html#etiology
(last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
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abnormalities, stroke, or childhood infections.143 It can also be
caused by complications at birth such as lack of oxygen to the
baby’s brain.144 Additionally, the mother’s compromised health
and environmental factors might create biological conditions
that place the fetus, baby or child at risk for mental
retardation. For instance, mental retardation might result from
a pregnant woman who is chemically addicted, malnourished,
or prescribed certain medications.145 It may also result from
abuse of the child or head injury.146
The etiologies of schizophrenia and mental retardation
differ in that on the one hand, a first psychotic episode related
to schizophrenia generally occurs in the early to mid-twenties
for males, the later twenties for females.147 In contrast, mental
retardation can arise in infancy and must generally be present
before a child turns 18 years old.148 Yet whether caused by
genetic factors alone or influenced by the environment, both
schizophrenia and mental retardation involve conditions which
indicate that the brain has been affected in a way that
produces significant vulnerabilities in the individual.
2.

Decreased moral culpability in criminal offenders
with schizophrenia

Although people with schizophrenia might not be of
subaverage intelligence as are people with mental retardation,
many people with schizophrenia actively experience cognitive
disturbances.149 These problems can include difficulties in:
remembering, orienting oneself to time and place,
concentrating, processing information, and thinking abstractly
or in a goal-directed way.150 As a result, people with
schizophrenia often exhibit behavior marked by impulsiveness

143

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER ON
BIRTH DEFECTS AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, MENTAL RETARDATION, available
at http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/dd/ddmr.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 282.
148
Id. at 44.
149
See DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 274; OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 4, ADULTS AND MENTAL
HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, OVERVIEW, (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.
gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter4/sec4_1.html#etiology (last visited Dec. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Adults and Mental Health].
150
Id. See also DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 279.
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and “chaotic or imprecise planning.”151 These disturbances could
exist in addition to psychotic symptoms that might distort the
person’s perception of reality and cause illogical thinking.152 For
instance:
[P]atients suffering from paranoid-type symptoms—roughly onethird of people with schizophrenia—often have delusions of
persecution, or false and irrational beliefs that they are being
cheated, harassed, poisoned, or conspired against. These patients
may believe that they, or a member of the family or someone close to
them, are the focus of this persecution.153

Such thought disorders diminish the culpability of defendants
with schizophrenia just as do the cognitive limitations of
defendants with mental retardation.
People with schizophrenia similarly are not necessarily
found to be more likely to engage in violence than others.154
Studies that formerly found a link between violence and
disorders such as schizophrenia have since become
controversial, if not outdated.155 Researchers have asserted that
“Mental disorders—in sharp contrast to alcohol and drug
abuse—account for a miniscule portion of the violence that
afflicts American society.”156 The only segment of the population
151

See Gerard E. Hogarty et al., Cognitive Enhancement Therapy for
Schizophrenia, Effects of a 2-Year Randomized Trial on Cognition and Behavior, 61
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, 866, tbl. 1 (Sept. 2004). See also infra Part IV.C.3.
152
Schizoprhenia, supra note 116.
153
NIMH, supra note 115, at 5.
154
While the Court in Atkins referred to the likelihood of people with mental
retardation to engage in “crime” in general, medical research of individuals with severe
mental disorders tends to focus specifically on violence. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
350-51 (2002). Thus, the following discussion of research findings pertains only to
violence.
155
Cameron Wallace et al., Criminal Offending in Schizophrenia Over a 25Year Period Marked by Deinstitutionalization and Increasing Prevalence of Comorbid
Substance Use Disorders, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 716 (2004). A noteworthy British
national clinical survey found that “There [were] substantial rates of mental disorder
in people convicted of homicide. Most [did] not have severe mental illness or a history
of contact with mental health services.” Jenny Shaw et al., Mental Disorder and
Clinical Care in People Convicted of Homicide: National Clinical Survey, 318 BRIT.
MED. J. 1240 (May 8, 1999). Some studies have also found that offenders with
schizophrenia are less likely to reoffend than offenders without schizophrenia, given
the same opportunity. Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally
Disordered Offenders, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL. L. 126, 131 (1997). Another study found that
“in the combined sample of offenders as well as among the insanity acquittees alone,
recidivism rates (both general and violent) were lower for those diagnosed as psychotic
than for nonpsychotic offenders.” Id.
156
John W. Parry, Criminal Mental Health Jurisprudence, 24 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 538, 542 (2000) (citing John Monahan & J. Arnold,
Violence by People with Mental Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates and
Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 67 (1996)).
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with schizophrenia that seems to definitively demonstrate a
strong correlation with increased violence is that which abuses
These
findings
comport
with
the
substances.157
acknowledgement that individuals with severe mental
disorders who receive sufficient treatment are no more
dangerous than the general population.158
In addition to cognitive disturbances and the finding
that “the total amount of violence in society attributable to
psychotic patients is small,”159 individuals with schizophrenia
also share with persons with mental retardation difficulties
157

These substances range from alcohol and marijuana to stimulants and
sedatives. Michael Soyka, Substance Misuse, Psychiatric Disorder and Violent and
Disturbed Behaviour, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 345 (April 2000).
158
APA Fact Sheet, Violence and Mental Illness, at 3 (Jan. 1998), available at
http://www.psych.org/public_info/violence.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) [hereinafter
Violence]. See also Treatment Advocacy Center, Consequences of Lack of Treatment, Are
People with Mental Illness Dangerous?, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/
PressRoom/presskits/abouttacdoc2.htm#lot_danger (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). Studies
have shown that persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and other
mood disorders were more likely than persons without a mental disorder to report
having been violent within a specific time frame and that this behavior was related to
the presence of psychotic symptoms. Rice & Harris, supra note 155, at 130. However,
persons with substance abuse disorders had a greater likelihood of engaging in violence
or other criminal behavior than persons with severe mental disorders. Id. at 130-31.
The American Psychiatric Association points out that the factors associated with
increased risk for violence are the same for those persons with mental illness as for
those persons without such a diagnosis. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Violence
and Mental Illness, Conditions that Increase the Risk of Violence, available at
http://www.psych.org/public_info/VIOLEN~1.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). These
factors include: history of violence among family members; lack of family or community
support; stressful, chaotic living situation; and exposure to an environment in which
substance abuse is common. Id. One body of research asserts that there is a significant
correlation between schizophrenia and violence. However, some researchers qualify
this finding by stating that:
[N]o sizeable body of evidence clearly indicates the relative strength of
schizophrenia or mental illness in general as a risk factor for violence
compared with other risk factors. Indeed, compared with the magnitude of
risk associated with the combination of male gender, young age and lower
socio-economic status, the risk of violence presented by mental disorder is
modest.
Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the Evidence, 180 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 490 (2002) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the evidence points to
substance abuse and psychotic symptoms as being factors distinguishing people with
schizophrenia who are at increased risk for violence. Id. Such findings are again
consistent with the understanding that untreated individuals with schizophrenia and
or those who abuse substances are more prone to violence.
159
Dale E. McNiel, Correlates of Violence in Psychotic Patients, 27
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 683, 684 (1997). McNiel refers to a study which later concluded:
[M]ajor mental disorder is a statistically significant but modest risk factor for
violence . . . . [T]he total amount of violence in society attributable to
psychotic patients is small (in part because serious mental illness itself is
rare), and that the level of risk posed by psychotic disorders is much less than
that of substance use.
Id.
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functioning in major life areas. Essential to a diagnosis of
schizophrenia are social and occupational dysfunction in which
“one or more major areas of functioning such as work,
interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the
level achieved prior to the onset. . . .”160 Individuals so diagnosed
frequently suffer from “unemployment, disrupted education,
limited social relationships, isolation, legal involvement, family
stress, and substance abuse.”161 These elements of
schizophrenia are analogous to the adaptive behavior deficits
that form part of the definition of mental retardation. A person
with mental retardation is limited in the level of academic
skills that he or she can acquire and may or may not be able to
develop the social and vocational skills necessary to be selfsufficient, depending on the level of mental retardation.162
When individuals with schizophrenia suffer an acute
phase, their level of functioning becomes more comparable to
that of people with moderate to severe mental retardation.
Although the conditions take on noticeably different
appearances, the capacity of either population to communicate,
think coherently and behave appropriately is similarly
substantially impaired. The psychotic symptoms tend to
influence the person to behave bizarrely, become agitated, and
speak nonsense.163 He or she might also be unable to bathe and
dress appropriately.164 Individuals with schizophrenia who lack
awareness of their illness also typically do not take their
medications.165
In sum, offenders with severe mental illness, although
not intellectually impaired, suffer from cognitive and
behavioral impairments analogous to the deficiencies
experienced by defendants with mental retardation found less
culpable in Atkins.
3.

Individuals with schizophrenia and the penal
justifications for the death penalty.

In keeping with the Atkins Court rationale, the two
penal goals of retribution and deterrence are not furthered by

160
161
162
163
164
165

DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 285.
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 109.
DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 41.
Id. at 276.
Schizoprhenia, supra note 116, at 276.
See text accompanying footnotes 122, 124.
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the execution of individuals with severe mental illness. In
Atkins, the Court weighed heavily the concern that:
[I]t is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make
these [defendants with mental retardation] less morally culpable—
for example, the diminished ability to understand and process
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning,
or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that they can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty
and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.166

Likewise, the Court should consider that the
deficiencies suffered by defendants with schizophrenia that
render them less culpable also impede their ability to refrain
from conduct based on a possible penalty of death. Indeed,
recent research has found that “[p]atients with schizophrenia
who commit violent acts have insight deficits, including lack of
awareness of the legal implications of their behavior.”167
The failure to make the critical connection between
conduct and legal consequences directly affects the capacity of
the defendant with schizophrenia to be deterred. Whereas
someone with mental retardation might not refrain from
committing an offense because his or her intellectual
functioning does not allow that person to see beyond the act to
the possibility of penalty, the individual with schizophrenia
might also not refrain from committing an offense because of
cognitive dysfunction or firmly held erroneous beliefs that lead
the defendant to think that he or she is acting in accordance
with reality.168
Justice is also not advanced in terms of retribution,
because a person with schizophrenia who commits a capital
crime is less morally culpable than a person without
schizophrenia.169 Retribution entails punishing the offender in
proportion to his or her culpability.170 The Supreme Court has
asserted that “[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to
the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”171
Accordingly, the death penalty is certainly a disproportionate
166

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
Peter F. Buckley et al., Insight and Its Relationship to Violent Behavior in
Patients with Schizophrenia, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1712 (2004).
168
See Violence, supra note 158, at 2. See also DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 275.
169
See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
170
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
171
Id.
167
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punishment to inflict on an offender with schizophrenia, who
by definition has experienced “profound disruption in cognition
and emotion, affecting the most fundamental human
attributes: language, thought, perception, affect, and sense of
self.”172
4.

Disadvantages
in
criminal
proceedings
associated with severe mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia

Apart from the limited applicability of the normal penal
justifications, greater potential for vulnerabilities in legal
proceedings present disadvantages to severely mentally ill
defendants that are similar to those faced by defendants with
mental retardation. One attorney’s statement that “[i]f the
defendant knows he is in a courtroom and can tell the
difference between a judge and a grapefruit, he is deemed
competent to stand trial,” albeit hyperbolic, alludes to the
concern that defendants who are mentally ill are assessed as
competent by low standards and are therefore often
inappropriately propelled into court.173 Defendants may
understand the role that each person plays in the legal process,
but because of delusions or impaired judgment, may distrust or
refuse to cooperate with defense counsel, or believe that a
defense is somehow unnecessary.174
Like persons with mental retardation, defendants with
schizophrenia might still be found competent to stand trial.
Their symptoms do not necessarily sever them completely from
reality.175 They might be aware, for example, that “people eat
three times a day, sleep at night and use the streets for driving
vehicles. For that reason, their behavior may appear quite

172

FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 109, at 269.
Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane:
The Colin Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
19, 25 (1995).
174
See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Opposes Death
Sentence for Mentally Ill Inmate, First Ohio Execution in 35 Years (Feb. 11, 1999),
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=8403&c=17 (last visited Jan.
24, 2004). See also Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway
Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal
Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 185-86 (2000). Situations in which
severely mentally ill defendants insist on self representation and refuse mental illness
defenses raise the issue of whether assistance of counsel should be mandatory to serve
the defendants’ best interests in capital cases. Id. at 186, 197-98.
175
Schizophrenia, supra note 116.
173
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normal much of the time.”176 On the other hand, once inside the
courtroom, people with schizophrenia may not be able to keep
up the appearance of normalcy because of their outward
responses to underlying symptoms. As in the case of an
individual with mental retardation, a defendant with
schizophrenia might also be a poor witness whose demeanor
“may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse.”177
Because a schizophrenic individual tends to “not show the signs
of normal emotion, perhaps may speak in a monotonous voice,
have diminished facial expressions, and appear extremely
apathetic,”178 his or her appearance in the courtroom might
have a similar adverse effect on the jury.
Perhaps most significantly, just as with mental
retardation, severe mental illness “as a mitigating factor can be
a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the
jury.”179 While most death penalty statute provisions create the
potential for severe mental illness to be a mitigating factor,180
studies have demonstrated that the factfinder often treats such
illness as an aggravator.181 For example, research into 128
Georgia capital cases in 1990 revealed that an unsuccessful
insanity defense strongly correlated with a sentence of death.182
Given that defendants who raise the insanity defense generally
present evidence of mental illness,183 this correlation suggests
that juries and judges may be influenced to impose the death
penalty even when mitigating evidence exists. This result is
not necessarily inconsistent with a finding of lesser culpability
in a severely mentally ill offender.184 Though studies using mock
jurors offer a range of theories to explain why the insanity
defense may fail for the afflicted defendant,185 it is the jurors’
176

Id. (emphasis added).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
178
NIMH, supra note 115, at 6.
179
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
180
See discussion supra Part IV.A. See also Christopher Slobogin, Mental
Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT. PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 667, 669 (2000).
181
Slobogin, supra note 180, at 669-70.
182
Id. at 669 (citing David Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY, 644-45 (1990)).
183
FRONTLINE, Insanity Defense FAQs, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/crime/trial/faqs.html (last visited March 1, 2005).
184
Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz et antilapse., Dangerousness, Risk Assessment,
and Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471, 475-476, 481 (2004).
185
Slobogin, supra note 180, at 670 (citing Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision
Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11
L. HUM. BEHAV. 113, 125 (1987); Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury
177
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perception of the defendant’s future dangerousness at
sentencing that appears to be the decisive factor in the decision
to impose the death penalty, regardless of the level of the
defendant’s culpability.186
The impact of a severe mental disorder such as
schizophrenia on a defendant is all-encompassing. When a
psychiatrist or other mental health expert diagnoses an
individual as severely mentally ill, that individual has been
evaluated as having vulnerabilities that ordinary people do not
share. These vulnerabilities span difficulties in obtaining
adequate treatment to the inability to meaningfully participate
in one’s legal defense. Professionals in the field of mental
health, such as members of the American Psychological
Association, recognize that these liabilities place the severely
mentally ill in a category of persons who should be spared from
the death penalty.187 As discussed in the next Part, Kelsey
and the Defense of Insanity, 8 L. HUM. BEHAV. 81, 90 (1984)).
186
Slobogin, supra note 180, at 670.
187
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION ONLINE, The Death Penalty in the
United States, Resolution, available at http://www.apa.org/pi/deathpenalty.html?
CFID=2646048&CFTOKEN=67528764 (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). People with bipolar
disorder and schizoaffective disorder have characteristics that impact them in a
manner sufficiently similar to individuals with mental retardation to the extent that
they, too, should be treated in the same way during capital sentencing. Both of these
illnesses entail impediments experienced by anyone with a severe mental disorder,
including: psychosis and other psychiatric symptoms induced by brain disorder;
recurrent need for hospitalization; lack of insight; complications with receiving
adequate treatment; and the risk of being perceived as a future threat to society due to
their psychiatric illness. See discussion supra Part IV.B. Additionally, people with
bipolar disorder experience alternating episodes of mania and depression throughout
their lifetimes. See NIMH, Bipolar Disorder: What is the Course of Bipolar Disorder?
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHbipolar.pdf (last visited March 20,
2005) [hereinafter NIMH, Bipolar Disorder]. While some individuals might experience
asymptomatic interludes, “as many as one-third of people [with bipolar disorder] have
some residual symptoms.” Id. Moreover, “a small percentage of people experience
chronic unremitting symptoms despite treatment.” Id. A diagnosis of schizoaffective
disorder, on the other hand, features symptoms of schizophrenia concurrent with
symptoms of either depression, mania, or both. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 292-96. This
complexity of symptoms leads to challenges in diagnosis of this disorder. See NATIONAL
ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, Schizoaffective Disorder, available at
http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Helpline1/Schizoaffective_Disorder.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004); see also NMHA, Schizoaffective disorder, available at
http://www.nmha.org/infoctr/factsheets/52.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter
NMHA, Schizoaffective Disorder]. People with schizophrenia might appear to have
deficiencies that lay persons more readily compare to people with mental retardation.
In the absence of full appreciation for the consequences of enduring longstanding
severe psychiatric illness by people with bipolar disorder or schizoaffective disorder,
the public might understandably be hesitant to group these individuals within a
category that includes offenders with mental retardation or schizophrenia. Yet given
that people with bipolar disorder or schizoaffective disorder share the same core
features of severe mental illness as those individuals with schizophrenia, they must
certainly be deemed less culpable than the average murderer. Accordingly, they too
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Patterson and James Colburn were, and Charles Walker is,
among such persons.
V.

CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

A.

Kelsey Patterson

Kelsey Patterson grew up in Palestine, Texas, raised by
his grandmother after his mother died when he was four years
old.188 He appeared to have a normal childhood and joined the
military following high school.189 He received an honorable
discharge after two years of service in order to care for his
grandmother who had become terminally ill.190 Patterson’s halfsister reports that his mental health began to deteriorate when
his grandmother died, that he became withdrawn and began to
talk and laugh to himself.191 When he was about twenty-fouryears old, the time period associated with a first psychotic
break in males, Patterson was arrested for aggravated assault
on a police officer.192
In the ensuing years, Patterson was charged with the
attempted murders of co-workers on two separate occasions.193
Psychiatrists diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia and
both times determined that he had been suffering from a
mental disease or defect at the time of the crimes and could not
conform his behavior to the law.194 Patterson was also arrested
for assault.195 The episodes of violence were accompanied by
paranoid ideation of being poisoned and raped.196 Patterson
spent months at inpatient psychiatric centers, including a state
hospital.197
Despite a pattern of extremely violent and paranoid
behavior, Patterson was evidently not receiving any significant
treatment at the time he shot Louis Oates and Dorothy Harris
should be excluded from the death penalty.
188
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, Kelsey Patterson, available at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessKPatterson.cfm (last visited Dec. 20,
2004) [hereinafter IJP, Kelsely Patterson].
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3.
192
Id. See also DSM–IV, supra note 53, at 282.
193
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. See also IJP, Kelsey Patteron, supra
note 190.
194
IJP, Kelsey Patteron, supra note 188.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
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in 1992.198 Although his half-brother had attempted to seek help
for him prior to the murders,199 there is no mandatory
treatment (i.e. involuntary commitment) for a person who is
not imminently a danger to himself or others.200 It may be
particularly difficult to obtain help even under ordinary
circumstances in the State of Texas, which recently ranked
47th in the United States for funding of treatment for the
mentally ill.201
Consistent with his psychiatric history, Patterson
continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia during his
competency hearing and throughout his trial. The judge
repeatedly ordered Patterson out of the courtroom due to
outbursts during which he would claim that electrical devices
had been inserted to his body or that he had been poisoned.202
Yet the mental health experts involved did not seem to
seriously consider these signs of severe mental illness.203
Grigson, the state forensic psychiatrist who had previously
found Patterson incompetent in 1980, undermined Patterson’s
claims of being a victim of ongoing conspiracy, food poisoning,
and inner ear implantation by suggesting that he had since
learned how to fake psychotic symptoms in order to manipulate
the judicial system.204 In contravention to professional medical
standards, neither Grigson nor the state clinical psychologist
Quijano had examined Patterson before declaring him to be
competent.205
198

AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
200
See Amy E. Lansing et al., The Treatment of Dangerous Patients in
Managed Care: Psychiatric Hospital Utilization and Outcome. 19 GEN. HOSP.
PSYCHIATRY, 112, 112 (1997); Harriet P. Lefley, Cultural Perspectives on Families,
Mental Illness, and the Law, 23 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 229, 237 (2000). See also
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3.
201
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3. Fifth Circuit Judge
Fortunato Benavides placed blame for the deaths on Texas’ mental health system.
Mike Tolson, Mentally Ill Killer’s Life on the Line, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 11, 2002, at
A37.
202
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **2. The AIUSA report states that at one
point the judge went so far as to order Patterson to be gagged with tape. AIUSA,
Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 11.
203
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 6-7.
204
Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **5. See also AIUSA, Another Texas
Injustice, supra note 1, at 7.
205
Indeed, Grigson, nicknamed “Dr. Death” because of his frequent testimony
for the prosecution in capital murder cases, was later expelled by the American
Psychiatric Association for making predictions about a defendant’s future
dangerousness without having examined them. Pat Gillespie, James Grigson Expert
Psychiatric Witness Was Nicknamed Dr. Death, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 14,
2004, at 4B. Apparently, Grigson and Quijano had only reviewed the medical files
199
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In addition to this questionable assessment of his
competence, Patterson himself further compromised his case
through disruptive behavior during his state post-conviction
hearing and imprudent decision-making in general. Despite the
damning evidence against him, Patterson rejected the
prosecution’s offer of a life sentence in exchange for a guilty
plea, chose to testify during the guilt phase of his trial, and
tried to fire his lawyers.206 Moreover, Patterson refused to
submit to examination by mental health professionals.207 Like
other mentally ill defendants before him, Patterson continually
made decisions against counsel’s advice and disobeyed the
judge’s orders in such a way as to demonstrate gross
impairment of judgment and lack of self-control.208
The prosecution, for its part, attempted to persuade the
jury to treat Patterson’s schizophrenia only as an indicator of
future dangerousness. “If you ever diagnose schizophrenia,”
said the prosecutor, “what that is going to do is give that
person a licence [sic] to kill anybody, anywhere, anytime, and
they come in and say, 15 years ago some psychologist said I
was schizophrenic. So, because of that I just blew two holes in
two people’s heads. You can’t hold me responsible for it.”209
Ultimately, Patterson’s rejection of a plea forced the jury to
choose between the permanent penalty of death and a prison
term which allowed for parole.
Despite the senselessness of the murders and the
prosecutor’s efforts to present evidence that Patterson had been
malingering or at the least would prove dangerous, the jury
nevertheless seemed to contemplate that he might not be
deserving of capital punishment, as evidenced by their request
for a dictionary to look up the meaning of “mitigating
circumstances.”210 In the end, the jury found Patterson to be a
future danger to society and that there was not sufficient
related to a 1984 hospitalization. AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 7.
206
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 9-11.
207
Id. at 14.
208
See, e.g., Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 173, at 23 (positing that a man who
suffered from delusional disorder, although deemed competent, should not have been
tried, because he “was clearly incapable of assisting in his own defense in any
meaningful way” and “lacked the capacity to trust any attorney enough to actually and
rationally evaluate the advice the attorney provided.”).
209
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 12.
210
Id. at 13. According to the AIUSA report, the judge denied the request and
instead had the Charge reread which instructed that “[t]he jury shall consider
mitigating evidence to be evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the
defendant’s moral blameworthiness.” Id. at 13 n.16.
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mitigating evidence to warrant a life sentence,211 which allows
for the possibility of parole after forty years.212
Patterson experienced insurmountable vulnerabilities
as a severely mentally ill defendant. Much like a person with
mental retardation, he displayed cognitive and behavioral
defects that reduced his moral culpability. Furthermore,
Patterson’s severe mental disorder diminished his ability to
contain himself in the courtroom, or to participate adequately
in his defense. Most significant, the jury considered Patterson
to be at risk of future dangerousness, given his history of
paranoia culminating in violence. This factor was dispositive of
Governor Perry’s decision to deny clemency, despite the Texas
Board of Pardons and Paroles’ 5-1 vote to recommend a life
sentence on the eve of Patterson’s execution.213 Patterson’s 2004
execution stirred debate over Texas’s lack of life without parole
option for capital defendants whose circumstances call for
mercy.214
B.

James Colburn

The 2003 execution of James Colburn perhaps even
more specifically highlighted the need to be conscious of the
deficiencies of severely mentally ill individuals and to approach
them with the same mindset as in the case of people with
mental retardation. James Colburn was executed on March 26,
2003 for the murder and attempted rape of Peggy Murphy.215
Colburn, a man with an extensive psychiatric history, presents
another apt example of an individual whose life might have
been spared, if not for the impairments caused by his severe
mental disorder.
Colburn first saw a psychiatrist at age fourteen.216 By
the time he reached seventeen in 1977 doctors had diagnosed

211

Id. at 13.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e)(2)(B) (2005) (describing
procedure in capital case).
213
Editorial, Our Turn: Perry Ignores Facts to Allow Execution, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS NEWS, May 20, 2004, at 6B.
214
See Editorial, supra note 213. See also, Editorial, Our View: Two More
Death Penalty Inequities, SPRINGFIELD NEWS LEADER, May 21, 2004, at 8A; Associated
Press, Senator Urges Sentencing Options, HOUS. CHRON., May 21, 2004, at 22; Scott
Gold, The Nation: Texas Weighs Its Life or Death Decisions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004,
at A17.
215
David Carson, TEXAS EXECUTION INFORMATION CENTER, James Colburn,
at http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/301.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
216
Id.
212
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him as having paranoid schizophrenia.217 Colburn suffered not
only from hallucinations, delusions and suicidal thoughts, but
also exhibited symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder as a
result of being raped while hitchhiking.218 Throughout his late
teens, Colburn received psychiatric treatment for his condition,
which included state hospitalization in 1979.219 His behavior
was marked by suicide attempts, self-mutilation, enuresis,220
and substance abuse attributed to his psychiatric disorder.221
From 1977 to 1991, he incurred six felony convictions,
including for aggravated robbery and arson, and served prison
time.222
During the week before the capital offense occurred,
Colburn had allegedly experienced increased psychosis,
eventually leading him to attempt an overdose on valium in
response to hearing voices telling him to commit suicide.223 The
next day he awoke to continued command auditory
hallucinations and later met Murphy on the street outside his
home.224 Colburn apparently invited Murphy into his home for a
drink of water.225 After she resisted his sexual advances, he
strangled her and stabbed her in the neck, killing her.226
Colburn immediately reported the crime to his neighbor who
phoned the police.227 Accounts of his videotaped confession
described how Colburn rocked back and forth, lost control of his
bladder, and shook uncontrollably.228

217

Id. This fact speaks to the longevity of Colburn’s illness, given that
schizophrenia normally has an age of onset in the early to mid-20s for males. DSM-IV,
supra note 53, at 282.
218
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, Mental Illness, James Blake Colburn, at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessJColburn.cfm (last visited Dec. 30,
2003) [hereinafter IJP, James Blake Colburn].
219
Id.
220
Enuresis is repeated urination during the course of the day into bed or
clothing, not due to a general medical condition. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 108.
221
IJP, James Blake Colburn, supra note 218.
222
Carson, supra note 215.
223
AIUSA, James Colburn: Mentally Ill Man Scheduled for Execution in
Texas, at 3, at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/AMR511582002
ENGLISH/$File/AMR115802.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter AIUSA,
James Colburn]. In the months prior to Murphy’s murder, records indicate that
Colburn had been receiving only sporadic outpatient treatment. Id. at 3.
224
Id.
225
Colburn v. Cockrell, 37 Fed.Appx. 90, 2002 WL 1021891, at **1 (5th Cir.
May 9, 2002).
226
Id.
227
Id. One account reports that Colburn stated he killed Murphy in order to
return to prison. Carson, supra note 215.
228
AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 2.

2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM

1030

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

While being detained prior to trial, Colburn apparently
received insufficient mental health treatment.229 Although
Colburn was indigent, the Texas county jail that housed him
required that he pay for medication from his inmate account.230
Revealing of his complete lack of insight, Colburn instead chose
to use his money towards small things like candy and soda.231
Without the psychiatric care and structure of an adequate
mental health regimen, Colburn’s condition during this period
deteriorated to the point of ongoing suicidal ideation, urination
and defecation on himself, auditory hallucinations, agitation,
and need for physical restraint.232
When a person such as Colburn suffers from a severe
mental disorder, they require medication to control their
symptoms.233 Throughout the course of the trial, Colburn
exhibited signs of heavy sedation as a result of receiving
regular injections of Haldol, a strong anti-psychotic drug.234 He
at times was sufficiently drowsy or asleep as to snore loudly in
court, prompting a recess in order for his lawyers to rouse
him.235 His lawyers argued that the sedative effects of the
medication prevented Colburn from effectively communicating
with counsel or understanding the proceedings against him.236
Although on appeal Colburn’s sedation was found not to impact
his competency, certainly repeated lapses into unconsciousness
placed Colburn at a disadvantage not normally experienced by
the average defendant at trial. At the least, his demeanor may
have caused him to come across as being disinterested in the
proceedings around him.
In addition to difficulties produced by the side effects of
Haldol, Colburn’s case was also compromised by use of only the
testimony of Walter Quijano, the court-appointed psychologist.
Colburn’s lawyers during postconviction proceedings argued
that his trial attorney should have hired a psychiatrist who
could explain the pharmacological and medical evidence to the
jury.237 Instead they relied on a psychologist who specialized in
229

Id. at 3.
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
See text accompanying footnote 117.
234
AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 4. See also Patty Reinert, High
Court Refuses Death Row Case, Mentally Ill Texas Man Will Seek Clemency from Perry,
Lawyers Say, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2003, at 5.
235
AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 4.
236
Reinert, supra note 234.
237
Colburn v. Cockrell, 37 Fed.Appx. 90, 2002 WL 1021891, at **11 (5th Cir.
230
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sex crimes238 and on Dr. Quijano, who, while finding that
Colburn’s schizophrenia was “intractable,” “chronic,” “not
expected to disappear,” and “difficult to treat,” determined that
he was sane because Colburn knew at the time he committed
the crime that his actions were wrong.239 It is possible that a
more lucid defendant might have urged the use of the more
favorable or informed testimony at his trial or played a more
active role in his defense.240 Yet drowsy from medication during
the course of the proceedings and “chronically mentally ill” as
diagnosed by the court-appointed psychologist,241 Colburn did
not appear to have had that opportunity.
Despite the prosecutor’s efforts to convince jurors to
consider solely the death penalty,242 they initially contemplated
a life sentence. While in deliberation, the foreman specifically
asked the judge whether a life sentence would entail the
possibility of parole for Colburn.243 Afterwards, one juror was
quoted as saying, “Had I realized that he would not finish
serving his prison time until he was over 70 years of age, I
sincerely believe that I would have voted to give him a life
sentence.”244 Without this knowledge, and believing that
Colburn presented a future danger to society, the jury
eventually inflicted a sentence of death on Colburn.245
C.

Charles Walker

While the involvement of Patterson and Colburn in
their respective crimes is without question, Charles Walker’s
role in the murder for which he was convicted is in dispute.
Similar to Patterson, Walker refused to plea-bargain. His case
stands apart from Patterson’s, however, in that Walker

May 9, 2002).
238
Id.
239
AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 3-4.
240
While trial preparation and witness selection are normally within the
lawyer’s control, the lawyer has a duty to “reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.” AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, Communication. Here,
there is no indication that Colburn’s trial attorney effectively communicated any
strategies to Colburn, or that Colburn had even expressed his objectives.
241
AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 4-5.
242
Id. at 5.
243
Id. The judge reportedly responded that issues of parole were not the jury’s
concern. Id.
244
Id.
245
See IJP, James Colburn, supra note 218.
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exposed himself to the death penalty when there were, and still
remain, questions about his guilt.
Like Patterson and Colburn before him, Charles Walker
has been diagnosed with severe mental illness. Initially
diagnosed with schizophrenia during childhood, he was later
evaluated during his prosecution as having bipolar disorder
with psychotic features.246 In 1995, he was convicted of the first
degree murder of Tito Davidson.247 In December of 2004, he
received a stay of execution pending further examination of
claims that he is constitutionally ineligible for the death
penalty and may in fact be innocent.248
A glimpse of Walker’s background reveals an extensive
history of mental illness compounded by extreme childhood
abuse. Walker was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1965, to a
“mentally unstable” father and a mother addicted to alcohol
and cocaine.249 At age two, his father left and his mother
remarried an abusive man who later shot and stabbed her.250
His mother is said to have punished Walker repeatedly,
including whipping him with electrical cords and a dog leash,
denying him food, and burning his penis with an iron.251 Walker
was first diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at age ten
when he received inpatient psychiatric treatment due to his
bizarre and violent behavior, paranoia, auditory hallucinations,

246

See INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, Mental Illness: Charles Walker, at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessCWalker.cfm (last visited Jan. 29,
2005) [hereinafter IJP, Charles Walker]. “People with bipolar disorder who have these
symptoms are sometimes incorrectly diagnosed as having schizophrenia.” NIMH,
Bipolar Disorder, supra note 187. The mental health expert who examined Walker
most recently found him to be “understandably depressed and anxious” and that his
mental condition was currently in “remission.” State’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion
for Appropriate Relief and Application for Stay at 27, State v. Walker, 469 S.E.2d 919
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 901 (1996) (Nos. 92CR 520762, 70920). The
finding that Walker’s symptoms appear to be “in remission” is consistent with the
general course of a severe mental disorder, which may include periods of exacerbation
and remission. See supra notes 118 and 134.
247
See Motion for Appropriate Relief with Application for Stay of Execution
at 1, Walker (Nos. 92CR 520762, 70920) [hereinafter MAR] (on file with author).
248
Order Regarding Claims I and VI at 5, Walker (Nos. 92CRS 20762, 70920)
(on file with author).
249
MAR, supra note 247, at 8, 20.
250
Id. at 9. Walker’s cousin reports that Walker witnessed his mother’s
boyfriend stab her, possibly describing the same incident. Id. at 20. Walker’s mother
survived the attack and died in 1994 of acute and chronic cocaine intoxication. Id.
251
See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. See also AIUSA, Urgent Action,
Charles Anthony Walker, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511652004?
open&of=ENG-USA (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter AIUSA, Charles Anthony
Walker]; MAR, supra note 247, at 9, 20, 21-22.
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and incoherent thought processes.252 His second hospitalization
in 1976 at age eleven lasted about four months.253
Accounts of his conduct during adolescence coincide
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.254 By age twelve, he lived on
the streets of New York City.255 When in school, he attended a
special education program, but his attendance was at best
sporadic.256 At seventeen years old, Walker went to prison for
shooting a man he claimed had been following him around to
hurt him.257 He did not receive treatment during the
approximately six years of his incarceration.258 Less than two
years after his release, Walker’s parole was revoked and he
returned to prison for another year until his release in 1991
when he was twenty-five years old.259 On August 11, 1992, Tito
Davidson, the young man Walker is alleged to have murdered,
disappeared in Greensboro, North Carolina.260
The
circumstances
surrounding
Davidson’s
disappearance are vague. On August 13, 1992, an anonymous
informant relayed to police that a body had been placed in the
dumpster of a particular apartment.261 Police searched through
the trash, and, finding nothing, looked through tons of landfill
refuse as well, without finding a body.262 The statements of
Antonio Wrenn, a suspect in an unrelated shooting, eventually
led authorities to six other alleged participants in Davidson’s
suspected murder: Rahshar Darden; Pamela Haizlip; Jesse
Thompson; Sabrina Wilson; Nickie Summers; and Charles
Walker.263
As in the cases of Patterson and Colburn, the outcome of
the legal proceedings demonstrate that Walker, as a person
with a severe mental disorder, was enormously disadvantaged.
Walker’s co-participants, Darden, Thompson, Wrenn, and
Haizlip each had the wherewithal to accept plea arrangements,
while Wilson and Summers cooperated with the State in
252

IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. MAR, supra note 247, at 9.
MAR, supra note 247, at 9.
254
IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. See also AIUSA, Charles Anthony
Walker, supra note 251.
255
AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251.
256
MAR, supra note 247, at 20-21.
257
Id. At 9-10. Walker had been living in an abandoned building at the time.
AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251.
258
AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251.
259
Id.
260
MAR, supra note 247, at 2.
261
AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251.
262
Id.
263
Id. See also MAR, supra note 247, at 2-3.
253
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providing testimony and were never charged.264 Walker, on the
other hand, described by the psychiatrist who evaluated him
during this period as paranoid that the defense counsel was
assisting the prosecution,265 refused the state’s offer of a seconddegree murder plea.266 Dr. Billy Royal noted Walker to be not
only “extremely paranoid,” but also “highly grandiose [with]
profound difficulties in distinguishing fantasy from reality.”267
Just as Patterson and Colburn had been found competent to
stand trial, Dr. Royal found Walker to be legally competent.268
Yet Dr. Royal qualified his evaluation with the following
statement:
Mr. Walker throughout the interviews had an inability to deal with
the reality of what was going on in terms of his legal status, trial,
options that he had. There was a consistent view of himself that was
different from what the facts of life showed, in terms of his behaviour
[sic] and functioning. He was never able to come to grips or deal
adequately in a major way with his attorneys, or with myself, or
with other persons who tried to deal with him in terms of his legal
status, the evidence that appeared to be related to his crime or what
his potential was for the future.269

Walker’s decision converted the proceedings into a
capital case. Although the state of North Carolina now allows
264

MAR, supra note 247, at 2-3. Haizlip admitted proximity and pled to
accessory to murder with time served in exchange for testimony. Id. at 3. Darden
admitted shooting Davidson in the chest four times and once between the eyes. He
served a total of six years for murder 2. Wrenn pled to accessory to murder 1 and
served seven years. Id. Thompson admitted slashing Davidson’s throat and bragged
about firing the shot that killed him. He pled to murder 2 and received a life sentence.
He is now eligible for parole. Id. See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. See also
Danica Coto, Inmate on Death Row Spared in Final Hours, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec.
3, 2004, at 1A; AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251; Lisa Hoppenjans,
Judge Stays Friday’s Execution of a Greensboro Man, WINSTON SALEM J., Nov. 30,
2004, at B1.
265
See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246; MAR, supra note 247, at 21.
266
See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. Forensic psychiatrist Dr.
Seymour Halleck made a thorough review of this case, including school and prison
records, and interviewed Walker in person. Dr. Halleck expressed particular concern
about “the severe limitation upon Walker’s ability to cooperate with his trial attorneys
due to his paranoid belief that they were helping the prosecutor.” MAR, supra note 247,
at 21.
267
IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. It should be noted that although Dr.
Royal interviewed Walker and his family and reviewed certain records, the psychiatrist
was impeached because he had not reviewed Walker’s school or prison records and he
was unaware of Walker’s extreme childhood abuse history. MAR, supra note 247, at 1011, 21. However, Dr. Royal had first-hand knowledge of Walker’s behavior during the
legal proceedings and it is for this reason that Dr. Royal’s perceptions of Walker at that
time are included.
268
Id.
269
Id.
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for prosecutorial discretion in trying a defendant capitally for
first degree murder when an aggravating circumstance is
present, this option did not exist until 2001.270 Due to the
especially cruel nature of the murder allegations and because
Walker had a prior violent felony conviction, the state had no
recourse at that time but to seek the death penalty for
Walker.271 Without adequate consultation with defense counsel
and by his own impaired judgment, Walker had placed his life
at stake.
The trial contained a number of weaknesses that
Walker might have been able to challenge if he had been free of
severe mental illness. The prosecution relied solely on the
uncorroborated testimony of co-participants who had reached
plea agreements with the State. There was no physical
evidence linking Walker to the crime.272 The testimony provided
by the participants contained numerous inconsistencies.273
Additionally, because Walker refused to provide information
about his history of mental illness and severe childhood abuse
to Dr. Royal,274 the jury did not hear all relevant mitigating
evidence.275
The magnitude and complexity of a capital trial under
“ideal” circumstances would seem to require that a defendant,
at a minimum, collaborate with defense counsel. Walker’s
apparent paranoia towards his own attorneys can be
analogized to the lapse in procedural protections that could
occur due to the mental retardation of a defendant, which
caused the Court significant concern in Atkins.276 Being at
extreme odds with defense counsel undoubtedly decreases the
communication between attorney and defendant. In Walker’s
270

State v. Ward, 555 S.E.2d 251, 260 (N.C. 2001).
AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251, at 1. See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (2004).
272
MAR, supra note 247, at 12-15.
273
Darden testified that Walker had hit Davidson on the knee with a
hammer, but Haizlip testified that it was Thompson who had hit Davidson with the
hammer. Id. at 6. Darden also testified that Walker had fired the fatal shot at
Davidson’s neck, but this testimony was contradicted by accounts that Thompson had
bragged about fatally shooting Davidson in the chest. Id. at 16.
274
Id. at 30.
275
Review of an Amnesty International report and State v. Walker, suggests
that Walker’s relatives came forth sometime after his conviction to provide further
illumination of his background. 469 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. 1996); AIUSA, Charles Anthony
Walker, supra note 251. The additional information referred to has been brought up on
appeal. MAR, supra note 247, at 19-22. Walker was able to share details about his past
with Dr. Seymour Halleck, the psychiatrist who examined him most recently. Id. at 21.
276
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
271
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case, at the least his mitigation evidence could have been more
thoroughly developed in a timely manner. The combined effect
of Walker’s compromised mental state, the nature of the
testimony presented at trial, and the deficient mitigation
evidence possibly jeopardized the fairness of his proceedings.
Although the jury acquitted Walker of delivering the
fatal gunshot wound, the jurors recommended a sentence of
death after four days of deliberations.277 Based on the testimony
of witnesses, albeit uncorroborated, the jury found that Walker
had “acted in concert with others with the intent to kill
Davidson.”278 Again the issue of future dangerousness appears
to have played a key role in the sentencing. The jury
recommended the death penalty despite finding that Walker
had been mentally or emotionally disturbed at the time of the
crime and that his disturbances were caused by childhood
trauma and mental illness.279 The jurors considered the
possibility that Walker would be paroled under a life sentence
influential to their decision.280 Two jurors suggested that they
would have found the additional mitigating evidence brought
up on appeal to be significant.281 Further, some of the jurors
later expressed that life without parole was the appropriate
sentence for Walker, but it had not been available at that
time.282 Not only did Walker’s rejection of a plea agreement turn
the proceedings into a capital case, but his failure to cooperate
with defense counsel may have prevented the jury’s access to
the complete mitigation evidence, evidence which had the
potential to outweigh concerns about future dangerousness.

277

AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251. This recommendation
was controversial, because no person has ever been executed in North Carolina in a
case in which the body was never found. See Estes Thompson, Condemned Man’s
Lawyers Say Case Lacks Evidence: Inmate to Be Executed for Slaying in Which Body
Was Never Found, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 30, 2004, at 3B.
278
MAR, supra note 247, at 11.
279
State v. Walker, 469 S.E.2d at 924 (N.C. 1996).
280
North Carolina adopted a life without parole option in October of 1994
which did not apply retrospectively. For offenses occurring prior to that date, a
sentencer had to choose between death or life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole after twenty years. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002(a) (2004). See also MAR,
supra note 247, at 24.
281
One specifically stated that she would not have voted for the death penalty.
See MAR, supra note 247, at 22. The mitigating evidence described in State v. Walker,
while in itself troubling, does not convey the full breadth of Walker’s history of
psychiatric illness or trauma and thus suggests that the jury could not have had a full
appreciation for the severity of the abuse or mental illness experienced by Walker. Id.
at 19-22.
282
Id. at 24.
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Patterson and Colburn’s lives were marked, and
Walker’s life has been marked, by a history of psychiatric
symptoms, sporadic, reactive attempts to treat them, and
coinciding maladaptation to normal life activities. While their
intelligence levels may not have been subaverage, their severe
mental disorders rendered them both less culpable and more
vulnerable during legal proceedings. These same attributes
were sufficient to convince the Supreme Court to
constitutionalize the consensus that defendants with mental
retardation should not be executed. Although jurors appeared
to recognize that Patterson, Colburn, and Walker suffered from
severe mental disorders, the defendants’ illnesses were not
considered as mitigating factors. The sentencers in Patterson
and Colburn’s cases ultimately chose to view the mental
disorders as aggravators, and in Walker’s case this vital
information was simply unavailable. But as discussed above, a
complete picture of the impact of severe mental illness on the
individual reveals that execution was and is a disproportionate
punishment for each of these three defendants.
VI.

TENNARD V. DRETKE, SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AS AN
AGGRAVATOR, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING
ATKINS TO DEFENDANTS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS

A.

Tennard v. Dretke283

If severe mental illness is accepted as comparable to
mental retardation in its impact on the individual, it must also
have comparable mitigating effect. As explained in Tennard,
the mitigating effect of mental retardation under Atkins is
broad.
Tennard involved a man described as “gullible” with an
I.Q. of 67 who was convicted of capital murder in Texas.284
Tennard had sought postconviction relief, claiming that the
jury instructions did not allow the sentencer to give mitigating
effect to Tennard’s low I.Q. and gullibility.285 After Tennard lost
his appeals in the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit held that he
was not entitled to a certificate of appealability because his I.Q.
score did not establish mental retardation, and that even if it

283
284
285

124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).
Id. at 2565-66.
Id. at 2566-67.
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did, “[Tennard] did not show that the crime he committed was
attributable to his low I.Q.”286
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
requirement that a nexus exist between low I.Q. and the
capital crime in order to consider mental retardation as a
mitigator.287 In the Court’s holding, Justice O’Connor clarified
that “[i]mpaired intellectual functioning has mitigating
dimension beyond the impact it has on the individual’s ability
to act deliberately.”288 Indeed, Atkins had explained that
“impaired intellectual functioning is inherently mitigating.”289
Likewise, just as the issue in the case of a defendant with
mental retardation would not be whether that defendant’s low
I.Q. caused the crime, the issue in the case of a person with
severe mental illness would not be limited to whether that
person was actively psychotic at the time the capital crime was
committed. In this respect, any concerns about a lack of nexus
between a severe mental disorder and the crime would be
entirely at odds with the Tennard holding.290 “The question is
286

Id. at 2568.
Id. at 2570.
288
Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572 (emphasis added).
289
Id. at 2571.
290
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) appears to erroneously raise a
parallel concern in a statement advocating the exclusion of defendants with severe
mental illness from capital punishment. Although the APA states that “[T]he core
rationale for precluding death sentences for defendants with mental retardation is
equally applicable to defendants with severe mental illness,” the APA retreats from
this position. The APA proposes modifying the language of the Model Penal Code to
include prohibiting the execution of defendants if, at the time of the offense, they had a
“severe mental disorder” that “significantly impaired” their capacity “to exercise
rational judgment in relation to their conduct.” In doing so, the APA uses legal
provisions to narrow a medical classification of mental disorders. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Position Statement, Diminished Responsibility in Capital
Sentencing, Nov. 2004. By tying the definition of severe mental disorders to the
insanity defense, the APA clearly does not incorporate the substance of Tennard into
its suggested changes. The APA bases its proposed changes on its concern that “[E]ven
among persons with major mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, symptoms vary
widely in severity, as does the impact of the disorder on the person’s behavior.” Id. Yet
among persons with mental retardation, the level of impairment of intelligence also
varies widely, so much so that the APA has divided the levels into four categories, in
addition to a general category where mental retardation is strongly presumed, but the
person’s intelligence is not testable. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 40. The limitations in
adaptive skills, too, vary widely among individuals with mental retardation. Indeed, in
their definitions of mental retardation, both the AAMR and APA require limitiations in
as few as two areas of adaptive skills which include: communication, self-care, home
living, and social skills. See DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 46. See also AAMR, supra note
52. Despite this variation, the Atkins Court did not deem it necessary to narrow the
category of individuals with mental retardation, where this condition reduces their
moral culpaibility in general. See supra text accompanying note 56. In light of the
argument that a death sentence would essentially be disproportionate to the
culpability of the offender with severe mental illness for the reasons set forth in this
287
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simply whether the evidence is of such a character that it
‘might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.’”291
By clarifying the expansive role mental retardation
plays in mitigation, the Court in Tennard acknowledged and
cautioned against the tendency to give a low IQ aggravating
effect in considering future dangerousness, but to dismiss
mental retardation as irrelevant in mitigation.292 As described
above, this problematic interpretation occurs frequently in
cases of severely mentally ill defendants, in which the
prosecutor is all too ready to instill jurors with a sense that the
defendant before them is dangerous and will kill again, thereby
urging them to disregard the mitigating effects of the mental
disorder and recommend a sentence of death.293
B.

Severe Mental Illness as an Aggravator

The factfinder’s tendency to consider severe mental
illness an aggravator is aptly illustrated by the sentencing of
Patterson and Colburn. The Texas capital sentencing scheme
gained much attention after Penry for its cumbersome jury
instructions, which even after revision remain confusing, and
the statute continues to raise controversy for its lack of a life
without parole option.294 In a discussion addressing this issue,
Amnesty International, a human rights organization, notes:
Even today, there is public fear and ignorance around the subject of
mental illness. Under the Texas capital sentencing scheme, even if
the defence [sic] attorneys put on a persuasive case that their client’s
mental illness demands compassion, it may not be enough to
overcome jurors’ fears of the individual in front of them, whom they
have just convicted of a violent crime . . . a prosecutor’s bid for a
death sentence may lead such officials to play on juror fears and
make a death sentence more likely under Texas’s capital sentencing
scheme.295

A defendant like Kelsey Patterson with an unequivocal
history of violent behavior would arouse understandable
Note, the Court, and certainly the APA, should not narrow the category of capital
defendants with severe mental illness by requiring a nexus between the defendants’
severe mental illness and the capital crime or the capacity to commit it.
291
Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2571 (internal citations omitted).
292
Id. at 2572.
293
See AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 11-12. See also
Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572-73.
294
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e)(2)(B), supra note 212
(describing procedure in a capital case).
295
AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 5.
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concerns for the jury. However, the circumstances surrounding
the sentencing of James Colburn make it clear that at least
some jurors feel a compassion for defendants with severe
mental illness that conflicts with their desire to prevent harm
to society. These jurors must be given a “vehicle for expressing
[their] ‘reasoned moral response’ to that [mitigating] evidence
in rendering its sentencing decision.”296 The function of
mitigation provisions in state death penalty statutes otherwise
becomes meaningless when the factfinder is not able to
acknowledge the qualities of a defendant that reduce
culpability. Furthermore, to disregard a defendant’s severe
mental disorder is to treat that defendant as an average
murderer and neglect to make a distinction between offenders
who are more deserving of capital punishment than others.297
C.

The Implications of Extending Atkins to Defendants with
Severe Mental Illness

A categorical exclusion of the severely mentally ill
would put to rest apprehensions about executing individuals
whose mitigating circumstances make them less culpable than
the average murderer. Still, such an exclusion may be difficult
for lay persons and the legal community to embrace, in part
because it opens up the probability that psychiatry (i.e. the
medical profession) will have a greater hand in determining
who can be disqualified from a death sentence.298 Whereas
defendants with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or
bipolar disorder who failed to successfully plead insanity were
previously executed, under the proposed exemption they would
no longer be eligible for the death penalty as individuals
diagnosed as suffering from severe mental disorders. As in the
296

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988)).
297
Berkman, supra note 65, at 293.
298
Concerns of inconsistency of diagnoses by physicians should be quashed. It
is the similar presentation of the individuals with schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder and bipolar disorder in terms of symptoms, behavioral deficits, and
disadvantages in criminal proceedings that substantively matter, not the names of
their conditions. Because these severe mental illnesses share common traits that make
it difficult to differentiate between the disorders, it is not unusual for physicians,
mental health professionals, and researchers to discuss them in tandem. See DSM-IV,
supra note 53, at 283-84; NIMH, Bipolar Disorder, supra note 187, at 4; NMHA,
Schizoaffective Disorder, supra note 187; Benabarre, supra note 114; Martin Harrow et
al., Ten-Year Outcome: Patients with Schizoaffective Disorders, Schizophrenia, Affective
Disorders and Mood-Incongruent Psychotic Symptoms, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 421
(2000).
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Atkins case and Ford v. Wainwright before it, each State must
develop “appropriate ways” to carry out this categorical
exclusion,299 particularly when the prosecution disputes that a
defendant is severely mentally ill. When a person is diagnosed
with a severe mental disorder after sentencing, that death
sentence would thereafter be commuted in order to comply with
the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, in order to ensure due
process and avert wrongful execution, the issue of mandatory
evaluation might be raised where defendants suspected to have
mental health issues refuse psychiatric examination.300
The Atkins court did not express concern that a
categorical exclusion of people with mental retardation from
the death penalty would increase the number of capital
offenses committed by that population, nor should this worry
exist with respect to individuals with a severe mental disorder.
Persons with severe mental disorders comprise a very small
portion of society to begin with and the prevalence of violence
associated with them is modest.301 Moreover, an exemption
would not exculpate the severely mentally ill from punishment
for serious crimes they in fact perpetrate. Rather, such an
exemption would recognize that the experiences of persons
afflicted with a severe mental disorder in developing a chronic
illness over time and dealing with its impact emotionally,
socially and in the courtroom, are accompanied by
vulnerabilities that may be unfathomable to the ordinary
person.
Creating a categorical exclusion of the severely mentally
ill from the death penalty requires offering alternative
sentences that adhere to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
299

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
The desire to protect client autonomy at times conflicts with the criminal
defense attorney’s role of providing effective representation. For a framework with
which to address this dilemma, see Christopher Slobogin, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer’s Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581
(1999).
301
Mental retardation affects between 1.5% to 2.5% of the population. AAMR,
Fact Sheet: The Death Penalty, at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_death_penalty.shtml
(last visited Feb. 1, 2005). Approximately 1.2% of American adults develop
schizophrenia. This estimate may also include those persons with schizoaffective
disorder. William E. Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in
the United States, 59 ARCH. GEN PSYCHIATRY, 115, 121, Table 4 (Feb. 2002). Bipolar
disorder affects roughly 1.2% of the population. NAMI, Bipolar Disorder, at
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness&template=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=10442 (last visited Feb. 1,
2005). See also Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the
Evidence, 180 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 490 (June 2002).
300
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against cruel and unusual punishment. There will be instances
when a life sentence without parole may be appropriate, but
effort should be made to explore institutionalization in a
psychiatric setting where a defendant who is diagnosed with
chronic schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or bipolar
disorder may receive sufficient, ongoing treatment. More
importantly, given that the larger societal concern appears to
be the fear of future dangerousness, policymakers within the
criminal justice system should combine their efforts with
mental health experts to work towards violence prevention in
identified high-risk individuals.
Based on the literature,302 resources should be
concentrated on increasing treatment compliance, reducing
substance abuse, and working with health care bodies such as
managed care companies to ensure adequate length of
inpatient psychiatric stays, or comprehensive outpatient
programs. A monitoring program should be required for any
severely mentally ill person with a known history of violent
behavior who refuses treatment, particularly if that person has
a co-existing substance abuse disorder. The potential benefits
of tracking these patients, perhaps through daily, face-to-face
contact with case managers, should outweigh any disquiet over
expenses incurred to supervise individuals who might not
currently appear in need of care. The cornerstone of
implementing these improvements would lie in educating the
public about mental illness and the need for a comprehensive
mental health system that addresses all facets of the afflicted
individual’s life, not simply treatment. Lawmakers should be
urged to invest in preventive measures rather than merely
fund the expansion of the penal system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The concept of “evolving standards of decency” suggests
a movement towards a more sensitive and informed morality
that analyzes the developmental, functional, and cognitive
makeup of offenders when assessing culpability. Indeed, in an
opinion that echoed the Atkins rationale, the Supreme Court
recently determined that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for juveniles.303 Although current legislation and
case law may suggest that American society is not yet at the
302
303

See supra text accompanying note 158.
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
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same point that the Supreme Court found it to be when it
decided Atkins in favor of individuals with mental retardation,
existing statutory provisions, the views of justices and religious
communities, national polls, and official statements by
professional bodies indicate that at least a significant segment
of the American public agrees with the widely held
international belief that people with severe mental disorders
should be spared from capital punishment.
It may be that society’s moral compass will someday
mature in a way that execution of the severely mentally ill will
be deemed unconstitutional. This maturity is likely to be
bolstered by a conscious effort to create an informed citizenry,
legislature, and criminal justice system which address and
incorporate the realities of mental illness into their decisionmaking, rather than shun the lessons of medical and mental
health professionals. In the interim, Justice Stevens’ opinion in
Atkins serves as a highly applicable rationale for courts to
consider in capital sentencing proceedings for defendants with
severe mental disorders.
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